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Abstract 
As part of an unwritten ‘social contract,’ nonprofit hospitals receive exemptions from federal and 
state property taxes in return for providing uncompensated care to community members who 
would otherwise be unable to afford the medical costs. However, literature has long debated the 
question of whether or not the tax exemptions are justified. In 2009, the federal government passed 
legislation mandating the public reporting of community benefit activities, instantly improving the 
standardization and transparency of reporting measures. Using IRS Form 990 Schedule H data 
from 212 hospitals across 18 states, this study uses a multivariate panel data model to assess for 
the impact of state-level regulations on nonprofit hospital community benefit behavior. Three 
dependent variables (charity care, total charity care and total benefits) and four types of regulations 
were examined. Results suggest that policies can influence community benefit provision, but the 
level of efficacy varies by regulation. 
 
Keywords: charity care, community benefits, policy evaluation, Schedule H  
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Introduction  
Hospitals have long been regarded as centers of healing for individuals of all walks of life. 
In the 1700s, the U.S. saw the emergence of isolation houses and almshouses devoted to the sick 
or the infirm. On top of serving strictly medical cases, the almshouses also provided custodial care 
to the poor and destitute. For most of the nineteenth century, only the socially marginal, poor, or 
isolated received medical care in United States institutions, while the middle and upper classes 
received care at home.  
In more recent history, policies have encouraged hospitals to continue the provision of 
uncompensated care in the face of rising healthcare costs (Weisbrod 1991). “Uncompensated care” 
includes charity care, bad debt, and shortfalls in government-sponsored care (such as Medicare 
and Medicaid), while “charity care” refers to the unbilled and uncollected expenditures for 
disadvantaged patients when the determination to provide care is made before the medical services 
are rendered (Raja, Arif, Warren-Findlow, and Racine 2013).  Because hospitals have a financial 
incentive to avoid providing free care, governmental bodies have enacted measures that aim to 
ensure that hospitals uphold their responsibility to the surrounding community’s welfare.  
The 1946 Hospital Survey and Construction Act, more commonly known as the Hill-
Burton Act, was the original compromise between nonprofit hospitals and the federal government. 
This act required hospitals to provide charity care if they wanted to be eligible for grants that 
encouraged hospital construction and facility modernization. Then in 1986, federal law in the form 
of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) required hospitals participating 
in Medicare and Medicaid programs to provide a minimum level of care to all patients of an 
emergency room regardless of their ability to pay (Kennedy, Burney, Troyer and Stroup 2010).  
4 
 
Today, one of the most salient questions surrounding the provision of charity care relates 
to its association with the favorable tax treatment of the non-profit hospital. As tax-exempt 
institutions, not-for-profit hospitals are expected to undertake charitable community endeavors – 
primarily in the form of providing uncompensated care – to promote community welfare in return 
for a lower tax burden. The tax exemption can be viewed as a “bargain” that was “struck between 
the hospital and the community: a hospital would treat patients who were unable to pay, and the 
government would grant a tax exemption to the hospital” (David and Helmchen 2006).  
In 2011, the value of this tax exemption was estimated at $24.6 billion (Rosenbaum, Kindig, 
Bao, Byrnes and O’Laughlin, 2015). Some of the highest average tax benefits per hospital by state 
included Massachusetts, California and Florida at $20.6 million, $15 million and $14 million, 
respectively. If communities do not receive such large dollar amounts from hospitals, they lose a 
hefty sum of public money. Therefore, in return for the tax break, hospitals can be reasonably 
expected to provide much of their tax exemption in medical benefits to the surrounding community. 
However, without strict regulations, hospitals have financial incentives to shirk this responsibility. 
Questions regarding whether or not these institutions are upholding their own end of the bargain 
and providing justifiable amounts of charity care have come under increased scrutiny (Rosenthal 
2013).  
This paper adds to the existing literature by taking a novel approach and using publicly 
available federal tax filings to evaluate how hospital provision of uncompensated care changes in 
response to the implementation of state-level charity care regulations. Hospital community benefit 
data from eighteen states for years 2009 to 2013 is used, giving the study a geographic reach and 
time span that has not yet been examined. Potential influences of market factors (such as local 
hospital competition and ownership composition) and community factors (including employment 
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status, racial composition and insurance status of the surrounding area) on uncompensated care 
provision will also be considered. While such predictors have been studied in isolation, this 
analysis will contribute a unique new approach by examining multiple variables as they relate to 
hospitals around the nation.  
Given the ever-growing price tag for medical care and increasing wage disparities, many 
people in America would not be able to afford their medical bills without external aid. This paper’s 
findings help elucidate effective aspects of regulations in influencing hospital community benefit 
behavior, and the findings may potentially help focus future efforts in policy design. In the greater 
picture, since a lack of health insurance puts individuals at a higher risk for medical problems 
throughout their lifetime, adequate provision of hospital charity care can quite literally save the 
medical and financial lives of patients who are unable to pay. 
 
Background 
Nonprofit and For-profit – Is there a Difference? 
While close examination of nonprofit charity care provision has recently gained traction in 
policy and media (Wall Street Journal 2009; Modern Healthcare 2016; The Sacramento Bee 2015), 
questions about the provision of nonprofit hospital charity care – particularly as it compares to the 
behavior of their for-profit counterparts – are old. This, in part, has been due to a historical lack of 
transparency in reporting standards. Some previous studies have found that, by receiving more 
social subsidies than their for-profit counterparts but failing to be more accessible to the uninsured 
and medically indigent, nonprofit hospitals have not fulfilled their social promise. (Herzlinger and 
Krasker 1987). Meanwhile, others came to the opposite conclusion: nonprofit hospitals return 
more social benefits, including access to care, than for-profits. (Arrington and Haddock 1990).  
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Though the economic and systematic environments of hospitals have drastically changed 
since these original findings, research on the validity of the non-profit hospital tax exemption has 
remained inconclusive. One side finds evidence suggesting that the provision of social benefits by 
nonprofit hospitals may fall short of their community benefit expectations (Nicholson, Pauly, 
Burns, Baumritter and Asche 2000). Meanwhile, the other side claims that on average, nonprofit 
hospitals provided higher levels of uncompensated care than did otherwise similar for-profit 
hospitals (Congressional Budget Office 2006). Some of this variation in findings may stem from 
the fact that, prior to 2009, each study designed a unique method of classifying and quantifying 
charity care due to the lack of available and uniform reporting standards.  
These opposing findings point to a conspicuous need for greater clarity in defining charity 
care, as well as standardization in its performance measurements and reporting methods (Clement, 
Smith and Wheeler 1994). Some authors even suggested that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
needed to issue a new revenue ruling specifying both qualitative and quantitative levels of annual 
charity care required from nonprofit hospitals as part of the community benefit standard 
(Aitsebaomo 2004).  
 
New Federal Regulations 
The call for more uniformity in charity care measurements and reporting did not fall on 
deaf ears. Beginning in 2009, hospitals under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code 
(which exempts nonprofit hospitals from federal income taxes) were required to submit a newly 
redesigned IRS Form 990 and the supporting Schedule H on an annual basis. Form 990 provides 
information on the nonprofit organization’s mission, programs and finances, while Schedule H 
specifically applies to hospitals and includes information on their activities, policies, bad debt and 
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levels of community benefit provision. Schedule H also breaks down “uncompensated care” into 
two main categories: “Financial Assistance and Means-Tested Government Programs” (including 
financial assistance at cost and unreimbursed Medicaid), and “Other Benefits” (including 
community health improvement services, community benefit operations and health professions 
education). By providing definitions and examples of terms such as “charity” and “community 
health improvement services” that assist hospitals in the proper classification of their activities, 
the forms provided a promising advancement towards standardization (See Figure I in the 
Appendix). Furthermore, the forms are readily available for public inspection. 
 The beginning of the public reporting prompted several new studies. Some researchers 
have used the new forms to quantify the amount of charity care provision. One of the first papers 
to use Schedule H found that on average, hospitals expended 7.5% of their operating expenses on 
community-benefit services and activities (Young et al. 2013). An earlier study using data from 
reporting requirements similar to Schedule H found that nonprofit hospitals in Maryland spent 7.4% 
of expenses on community benefits in 2007, and charity care accounted for one-third of the amount 
(Grey and Schlesinger, 2009). The value of uncompensated care costs was estimated to total 
between $46 and $51 billion in 2012 (DeLeire, Joynt and McDonald 2014), which highlights the 
economic significance of charity care, as well as the scale of individual lives affected.  
 In addition to determining charity care amounts, the advent of extensive, publicly available 
financial and community benefits reporting by hospitals enables the exploration of a host of other 
interesting research questions pertaining to nonprofit hospital community benefit provision. For 
instance, what local characteristics predict levels of charity care? How effective are community 
benefit regulations at altering hospital behavior? 
 
8 
 
Market Influencers of Uncompensated Care 
Studies have suggested that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals exhibit comparable behavior 
when faced with mutual market conditions. Evidence from Illinois, for example, indicates that both 
hospital types may have engaged in cost-shifting, raising prices to private paying patients in 
response to substantial reductions in Medicaid payments (Dranove 1988). If ownership differences 
are actually much less important than they first appear, then the differential tax treatment of the 
two firms may have caused excessive spread of nonprofit as compared to for-profit hospitals 
(Pauly 1987).  
The apparent convergence of hospital behavior is reflected in similar approaches to 
uncompensated care provision between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. Previous studies suggest 
that increased competitive pressures give nonprofit hospitals less latitude to produce outputs 
typically deemed to be socially worthy, and instead lead to more profit-seeking behavior (Sloan 
1998; Sloan 2000). In other words, as hospital competition increases in a market and nonprofit 
hospitals receive reduced profits from private patients, they may be less able to uphold their end 
of the ‘social contract’; charity care levels in more competitive areas likely decline over time 
(Gruber 1994; Keeler, Melnick and Zwanziger 1999). However, one difference that stands between 
nonprofit and for-profit hospitals relates to the hospital location decisions. For-profit hospitals 
exhibited a tendency to locate in market areas where the patient population has a higher ability to 
pay for hospital care and avoided states in which reimbursement was low (Sloan 1998). 
 While increased levels of competition in the market may lower uncompensated care 
provision, the composition of the competition may also influence nonprofit hospital charity care 
behavior. Prior studies indicate a greater difference in provision of uncompensated care between 
publicly run government hospitals and private hospitals than between either type of private hospital; 
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the effect of a hospital conversion from nonprofit to for-profit status on the provision of 
uncompensated care is ambiguous (Sloan 1998; Thorpe, Florence and Seiber 2000). However, 
uncompensated care costs are more concentrated among public hospitals and other hospitals that 
provide a disproportionately high level of uncompensated care (Cunningham 1997), which is 
congruent with the notion that both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals appear to seek opportunities 
to limit the costs of uncompensated care. Real cases of this kind of avoidance have been identified: 
in Florida, when charity care requirements were binding on hospitals, private hospitals “cream 
skimmed” the least risky maternity patients, thus providing less intensive maternity services 
without compromising patient health. However, when the regulations ended, the same hospitals 
reduced their charity care caseloads, pushing the unprofitable maternity patients to public hospitals 
(Almond, Currie and Simeonova 2010).  
 
Community Predictors of Uncompensated Care 
Demographic characteristics unique to a community may also influence charity care 
provided by hospitals. Examples of such factors include individual income, insurance coverage 
and employment status. Previous studies have found that low-income minority individuals and 
those with lower educational attainment are at greater risk for not having medical care access 
(Anderson et al. 2002), and minority children covered by Medicaid frequently use hospitals as 
their primary source of care. Adults below the federal poverty level also utilize hospital services 
at higher rates (Lillie-Blanton, Martinez and Salganicoff 2001). 
The specific association between demographic data and charity care provision has less 
conclusive findings, and literature that relates community demographic factors to uncompensated 
care levels is mostly limited in scope. Some studies are geographically constrained, and others are 
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limited by time, using only one or two years’ worth of data. Previous findings suggest that a 
decrease in the uninsured population in Minnesota resulted in over $50 million of savings in 
uncompensated care costs (Blewett, Davidson, Brown and Maude-Griffin 2003). Another study in 
New Jersey focused on age and income level, finding that most charity care users were non-elderly 
adults with family income below 200% of the Federal Poverty Level, and elderly residents 
exceeded children in charity care utilization (DeLia 2007). In California, a recent study examining 
racial effects found a significant relationship between growth rates in California’s Latino 
population and hospitals’ uncompensated care provision (Chen et al. 2015). Relating 
environmental predictors to market influencers, previous findings show that hospitals provide 
more uncompensated care in areas where residents have lower income, but provide less 
uncompensated care when in the same region as a major safety net hospital (Hsieh, Clement and 
Bazzoli 2010). Generally, the literature indicates that low socioeconomic status is associated with 
increased levels of hospital community benefits and charity care. 
Uninsured rates can also reasonably be expected to affect a hospital’s provision of 
uncompensated care. Since uncompensated care provision increases in the presence of higher 
demand (Hsieh, Clement and Bazzoli, 2010), hospitals in regions with higher rates of coverage 
may be more likely to provide less care to indigent populations. Along the same line, since 
uninsured admissions at major for-profit U.S. hospitals decreased by 50-70% in states that 
expanded Medicaid, in contrast with only 2-14% in states that did not (DeLeire, Joynt and 
McDonald 2014), Medicaid expansion may potentially decrease hospital provision of charity care. 
In fact, uncompensated care levels in Connecticut were found to be about one-third lower with 
Medicaid Expansion than they would have been without (Nikpay, Buchmueller and Levy, 2015). 
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If these patterns apply to all forms of insurance, then local uninsured rates likely play a large role 
in the supply of charity care.  
 
State regulations of uncompensated care 
While the analysis of market and community influencers of charity care take into account 
how the surrounding community might naturally affect hospital charity care provision and 
behavior, policies enacted specifically to increase levels of charity care provision can be 
reasonably expected to influence levels of charity care. Since the charity care regulatory 
environment has recently been changing at both the state and federal levels, a great opportunity 
exists to examine the efficacy of these policies.  
Although the IRS did not require tax-exempt hospitals to provide detailed information 
about their charity care activities until 2009, prior to the federal requirement, fifteen states had 
already enacted laws that required non-profit hospitals to report community benefit information 
on an annual basis. These states were California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah and 
West Virginia. Out of these states, ten required hospitals to report specific levels of charity care 
(Hellinger 2009). 
 Since these laws are at the state-level, they vary widely in language, level of detail and 
stringency of requirements. For instance, while most states did not specify penalties if hospitals 
fail to meet reporting requirements, Texas and Indiana had a civil penalty of $1,000 for each day 
the report is overdue. The widely varying legal constraints likely influenced the actual amount of 
charity care provided in each state. Despite the lack of standardized clarity for interstate 
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comparison of charity care levels, the laws still allowed for the preliminary study of how laws 
might influence levels of provision.  
Taking advantage of the state laws’ heterogeneity, previous studies have indicated that 
state laws may increase levels of charity care. For instance, the presence of a state reporting 
requirement compared to no requirement at all was associated with a 12.4% increase in the total 
hospital expenses dedicated to community benefits (Johnson 2012). With regards to the stringency 
of the language used, evidence from Indiana suggested that not-for-profit hospitals in states with 
relatively strict reporting requirements provide larger volumes of uncompensated care (Hellinger 
2009). Increases in the volume of charity care and other community benefits provided by non-
profit hospitals occurred primarily in states where reporting laws mandate specific levels, or set 
minimums, of community benefits. A comparison of nonprofit hospitals in Washington, California 
and Texas from 1996 through 1998 furthered this claim: Texas nonprofits – which faced strict 
minimum-standard laws – were providing three times more charity care and two times more 
uncompensated care than hospitals in the other two states, which had less specific, more process-
oriented regulations (Sutton and Stensland 2004).  
Although prior studies only examined a handful of states and might not be representative 
of how hospitals in all fifty states react to charity care regulations, the findings suggest that 
reporting requirements, particularly those including specific guidelines and minimum thresholds, 
may be associated with an increase in the volume of charity and community benefits.  
 
Federal Health Reform: Uncompensated Care Regulations and Consequences 
The changing landscape of national healthcare engenders an exciting time to study health 
policy efficacy. The Affordable Care Act (ACA), enacted March 2010, aims to make health care 
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more affordable, accessible and of higher quality for everyone in America. Among the many 
provisions made in the law, one introduced IRC §501(r), which includes four new requirements 
that tax-exempt hospital facilities must meet: 
1. Establish written and financial assistance and emergency medical care policies 
2. Limit amounts charged for emergency or other medically necessary care to individuals 
eligible for assistance under the hospital’s financial assistance policy 
3. Make reasonable efforts to determine whether an individual is eligible for assistance under 
the hospital’s financial assistance policy before engaging in extraordinary collection 
actions against the individual 
4. Conduct a community health needs assessment (CHNA) and adopt an implementation 
strategy at least once every three years 
 These new laws pertaining specifically to hospital charity care policies signal the federal 
government’s recognition of the importance of clarifying and reforming the way uncompensated 
care is provided. However, the language leaves much to providers’ discretion. For instance, while 
the first provision mandates written financial assistance policies, it does not specify guidelines for 
the eligibilities or thresholds of these policies. Similarly, while hospitals are now required to 
conduct a community health assessment, they are not required to use those findings to change the 
hospital’s practice, or connect the findings to their financial assistance policies. The new 
requirements impose new restrictions on how hospitals should bill and collect for uncompensated 
services, but are not grounded by results. With little standardization, hospitals are left to establish 
their own eligibility criteria and policies, and the change in the actual amount of charity care 
provided could be minimal. 
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 The compliance of hospitals with these new IRC §501(r) requirements has been mixed. 
The first requirement, establishing written policies, appears to be nearly universally met: in 2012, 
a total of 94% of hospitals had both written charity care and emergency medical care policies in 
place (Nikpay and Ayanian 2015). This first requirement, however, seems to be the easiest to 
achieve. Only 44% of hospitals regularly notified patients of their potential eligibility for charity 
care before initiating debt collection (requirement #3), 29% reported charging charity care patients 
the amounts generally billed to insured patients (requirement #2), and only 11% of hospitals had 
conducted a community needs assessment (requirement #4). The last statistic might be an 
underestimate, as the CHNA was not yet a requirement for all hospitals at the time the study was 
conducted.  
Failure to meet these federal requirements are severe, ranging from an annual $50,000 
excise tax for failing to conduct the CHNA, to a facility-level tax that is applied to income derived 
from the noncompliant hospital facility, to revocation of the hospital’s 501(c)(3) status (IRS 2015). 
The last measure, while seemingly drastic, has become an increasing threat to nonprofit hospitals. 
In 2010, the 202-bed Provena Covenant Medical Center in Illinois was stripped of its property tax 
exemption, with the presiding judge of the Illinois Supreme Court writing that the hospital did not 
clearly demonstrate that it ‘dispensed charity to all who needed it and applied for it’ and ‘failed to 
meet its burden’ to society (Crain’s Chicago Business, 2010). As a result, the Urbana hospital was 
ordered to pay $1.2 million in local property tax payments annually. One year later, tax exemptions 
were denied to three other hospitals – Prentice Women’s Hospital in Chicago, Edward Hospital in 
Naperville and Decatur Memorial Hospital in Decatur (CBS 2011). In 2012, five Illinois hospitals 
withdrew their applications for tax exemptions. In other parts of the nation, a ruling in June 2015 
by the New Jersey tax court found that Morristown Medical Center had shirked its non-profit 
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responsibilities, and as a result, the medical system was ordered to pay approximately $5 million 
in back taxes for the years 2006-2008 (Sanborn 2015). Hospitals in Ohio and Pennsylvania have 
also been scrutinized (Schencker 2015).  
The passage of the federal charity care mandates and the increased public interest on the 
topic reflect the importance of adequate charity care provision. Policymakers, academics and 
regulatory bodies all have a vested concern in seeing that charity care levels justify the tax 
exemptions. 
 
Methods 
Sample Selection 
Eighteen states from geographically diverse areas of the nation were selected for study. 
Hospitals in the data set are from the two largest metropolitan areas in each state. The eighteen 
chosen states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah and Wisconsin. 
When choosing the sample states, existing state legislation relating to charity care was 
considered. Recognizing that the nature of state-specific charity care laws is enormously varied, 
state charity care legislation was systematically analyzed in order to choose a set of states that had 
diversity in the presence and strength of laws. The “Community Benefit State Law Profiles 
Comparison” table compiled by the Hilltop Institute at the University of Maryland Baltimore 
County was heavily utilized, since the database includes links to legislation for all state laws 
pertaining to hospital charity care, as well as details about the tax exemptions for which the 
nonprofit hospitals qualified. Charity care legislation fits into eight overarching categories:  
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 Community Benefits Requirement 
 Minimum Community Benefits Requirement 
 Community Benefits Reporting Requirement 
 Community Health Needs Assessment 
 Implementation Strategy 
 Financial Assistance Policy 
 Financial Assistance Policy Dissemination 
 Limitation on Charges, Billing and Collection 
The legislation for each of these categories was coded according to the perceived strength of 
its language. In coding each law as strong, moderate or weak, a set of law strength standards was 
developed in order to maintain consistency. A “strong” law includes: 1) a reporting requirement, 
and 2) a quantifiable threshold for the community benefit. A “moderate” law specifies a reporting 
requirement that holds the hospital at least partially accountable. However, moderate laws have no 
specific requirement of benefits that the hospital must provide, and thus, are more open to 
interpretation with regards to the amount a hospital should provide. A “weak” law neither requires 
reporting nor includes measurable standards. Such a law is completely open to interpretation, and 
is signaled by words such as “recommends” or “reasonable. The strengths of the eight laws for 
each of the eighteen states of interest were visually represented on maps of the USA (see Figure II 
in the Appendix). 
At least three of the eighteen states implemented new legislation during the 2009-2013 time 
period in four regulatory categories: Community Benefits Requirement (CB), Financial Assistance 
Policy (FA), Financial Assistance Policy Dissemination (FAD), and Limitations on Charges, 
Billing and Collections (LCBC). Table I in the Appendix lists the sample of policy-implementing 
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and non-implementing states included in each model. Non-implementing states were further 
divided into two control buckets: those that had existing state legislation passed before 2009, and 
those that lack any state charity care legislation at all.  
 
Data 
The data used for uncompensated care information is from Form 990, including Schedule H, 
which became available after the passing of the federal mandate in 2009. Form 990, as previously 
explained, is an annual report that federally tax-exempt organizations must file with the IRS, 
providing details on the organization’s mission, programs and finances. Schedule H specifically 
applies to hospitals and includes information on their activities, policies, and levels of community 
benefit provision. The Form 990 and Schedule H data are supplied from Guidestar, which is a 
company that gathers, digitizes and disseminates nonprofit organizations’ federal filings. Initially, 
the dataset included 381 hospital names from eighteen specified states. After ridding the list of 
duplicates and narrowing it down to include only general medical and surgical not-for-profit 
hospitals, the final data set included 212 hospitals from the years 2008-2013. However, data from 
year 2008 was unreliable, likely because reporting in 2008 was not yet mandatory, so only data 
from 2009-2013 were used in analyses. 
  Market characteristics were collected from annual data generated by the American Hospital 
Association (AHA) on all hospitals in the United States. While the AHA collects up to 1,000 fields 
of information on topics that pertain to hospital organizational structure, staffing, purchasing and 
more, the three fields chosen – Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, for-profit share of hospitals in a city 
and government owned hospital share in a city – were chosen to represent market factors in each 
hospital’s geographic vicinity. 
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To obtain information on environmental characteristics, data from the American 
Community Survey (ACS) was used. The ACS, which is a national survey representing millions 
of U.S. households every year, provides information on a large selection of local demographics, 
including housing status, income level and educational attainment. The data is available at the zip 
code tabulation area (ZCTA) level, which largely corresponds with zip codes in the Guidestar data 
files. The ACS website has survey estimates from 2009 to 2013 freely available to the public.  
  
Model Specification 
A multivariate panel data model where hospital-year is nested in hospital was used for 
analyses.  Three separate dependent variables are examined: charity care percent, total charity care 
percent, and total benefits percent (see Table II for explanations).  Each represents a percentage of 
a hospital’s total expenses.  The model is specified as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Variable yit represent the continuous charity care dependent variable for hospital i at year t.  Xit is 
a vector of market-level factors, including the share of beds in the market provided by a 
government hospital, the share of beds provided by a for-profit hospital, and the Herfindahl-
Hirshman Index (HHI), which is a measure of market concentration.  HHI is calculated by squaring 
the market share of each hospital in a market in a year and then summing the values; a higher HHI 
value indicates lower levels of competition.  Policy represents a series of indicator variables for 
whether a state had no relevant legislation throughout the time period, had legislation throughout, 
or passed charity-care legislation at some point during the time period.  Post is the key variable of 
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interest, representing the influence of regulation post-passage; it is equal to 1 for the year a state 
passed a regulation and for all subsequent years, and 0 otherwise.  The model includes state and 
year fixed effects, and clusters standard errors at the state level.   
Separate models are run for each of four policy types, including community benefits, 
financial assistance, financial assistance dissemination, and limitations on charges, billing, and 
collection (see Table III).  This yields twelve sets of models – for each of the four policy types, all 
three dependent variables were tested.  Within each set, six models were specified to check for 
consistency in results. Half of the models (models 2, 4 and 6) excluded states that had passed 
“weak” legislation. Doing so allowed for an examination of whether effects varied by strength of 
policy. 
In a separate associational study, a different set of regressions were run to inspect the 
relationship between community factors and charity care, regardless of changes in charity care 
legislation. The results, however, remain very preliminary. The same three dependent variables 
were used, and the independent variables included a set of local community measures, including 
percentage of individuals unemployed, percent of black individuals, percent of Hispanic 
individuals, percent of individuals with low income (defined as under $40,000 annually), and 
percent uninsured. The data was divided by zip code tabulation area, and each measure was taken 
as a percentage of the hospital zip code tabulation areas’ total population. Standard errors were 
clustered on the state level.  
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Results 
Observed Trends  
In order to gain a greater visual understanding of the data, data for all three dependent 
variables were graphed for each of the four policies (See Graphs I - XII in Appendix). The overall 
average community benefit provision of the hospitals in the two control groups – “no law” and 
“existing” – from 2009-2013 are represented as horizontal lines, giving benchmark values for 
comparison. 
 Graphs I – III depict data sorted by CB regulations. Illinois, Pennsylvania and South 
Carolina were the three treatment states that adopted CB policy legislation during the time period. 
The graph of charity care percent bounces around, showing no clear trend, while the graphs for 
total charity care percent and total benefits percent show that hospitals in states that implemented 
a charity care law appear to start well below the two control groups, and then rise to similar levels 
by the time the laws were passed. 
The graphs for the two regulations are very similar to each other because the treatment 
groups are nearly identical; the FAD treatment group includes all three states of FA (Colorado, 
Illinois and Indiana), as well as North Carolina. Overall, graphs for FA and FAD regulations do 
not reveal a clear trend; instead the values for the treatment group fluctuate throughout the time 
period for each dependent variable. 
Graphs X – XII depict community benefit provision levels, grouped by LCBC policy 
passage. These treatment states include Illinois, Kansas and North Carolina. Before the passage of 
the LCBC policy, the charity care percent levels of the treatment states were already higher than 
the two control groups. However, for total charity care percent levels and total benefits percent, 
the average level of provision started at comparable levels to the control groups, but then outpaced 
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control levels over time. Total charity care and total benefits provision also peak during the year 
the LCBC legislation was passed. 
 
Regulation Effects 
Regression results indicated that the implementation of a Community Benefits (CB) policy 
did not have a significant effect on the provision of charity care alone, but all six regression models 
suggested that the CB policy increased total charity care provision and total benefits provision. 
The coefficient of Post represents the additional percentage of total hospital expense directed 
towards each community benefit category under the policy in question. Depending on the model, 
the increase in the amount spent on total charity care ranges from 1.18-1.66%, and the increase in 
amount spent on total benefits ranges from 1.69 – 2.20% (see Appendix, Tables IV - VII for full 
regression results). 
 Neither the Financial Assistance policy (FA) nor the Financial Assistance Dissemination 
policy (FAD) significantly affected levels of community benefit provision. These empirical 
findings reflect the lack of a visual trend found for the corresponding graphs (Graphs IV – IX). 
Some evidence exists for a small effect of FA policy on total charity care and total benefits 
provision, but only two out of the six models found such a relationship at even p<0.1. Furthermore, 
these two models looked only at states that passed legislation classified as “moderate” or “strong”.  
 Like the CB policy, results regarding the passage of Limitations on Charging and Billing 
Collections (LCBC) policies were statistically significant, indicating increased levels of all three 
dependent variables – charity care, total charity care, and total benefits. Depending on the model, 
in states that implemented an LCBC policy, the percent increase in the provision of charity care 
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ranged from 0.63 – 0.97%. The increase in total charity care ranged from 0.86 – 1.79%, and the 
models predicted a 1.40 – 2.32% increase in total benefits provision.  
  
Effects of Law Strength, Market Factors and Community Factors 
Close examination of the total benefits percent variable in Table IV shows that the 
coefficients of models run excluding states with weak legislation are greater than those including 
weak legislation for CB regulations. Specifically, the ‘cb_post_alt’ variable of model 2 has a 
greater coefficient than ‘cb_post’ of model 1, the coefficient for model 4 is greater than model 3, 
and the coefficient for model 6 is greater than model 5. All coefficients were statistically significant. 
The value for the models excluding weak legislation were, on average, about 0.14 percentage 
points higher for total charity care percent, and 0.24 percentage points higher for total benefits 
percent than those including the weak legislation. These results indicate that moderate and strong 
policies might be more effective than those that use weak language. For the LCBC regulations, 
none of the states in the treatment sample had weak legislation. Therefore, none of the states were 
dropped, and the effect of legislation strength could not be assessed.  
Some evidence exists for the influence of market factors on community benefit provision. 
However, across all regressions, this effect was contained to the provision of total benefits, 
Furthermore, only the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the share of government hospitals 
produced an effect; the presence of for-profit hospitals in the area does not appear to make a 
difference. For all four policies examined, on average across all models, a one standard deviation 
increase in the HHI was associated with a 1.46% reduction in the amounts of the total benefits 
provided. Similarly, a one-unit increase in the share of beds in the market provided by government 
hospitals has was associated with about an 8.01% reduction in total benefits percent.  
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The community factor analyses appear to suggest that an increase in the percentage of black 
individuals in a given zip code may be associated with an increase in the amount of total benefit 
provided by hospitals in the area. The other community factors examined – individuals under 18, 
unemployment, income level, and insurance status – did not appear to have any statistically 
significant effects. These results, however, are very preliminary and will require further in-depth 
examination. 
 
Discussion 
 Using hospital-reported data of charity care levels from 2009 to 2013 provided by Schedule 
H of Form 990, this study’s analyses demonstrate that policies regulating the provision of nonprofit 
hospital charity care can be effective, but the efficacy depends on the type of regulation passed 
and the classification of charity care considered. In general, legislation limiting the billing and 
collections practices of hospitals appear to have the largest effect, followed by policies specifically 
regulating community benefit provisions. Policies regarding financial assistance and financial 
assistance information dissemination, on the other hand, did not appear to produce any changes in 
uncompensated care provision. 
 Described by the Hilltop Institute as “legislation that, at minimum, requires hospitals to 
provide free or discounted care to indigent patients,” one would expect that the implementation of 
a community benefit (CB) regulation would result in an increase of charity care provision in 
hospitals that, prior to the regulation, were underproviding. This may be the reason why the data 
does not reveal statistically significant change for charity care provision under the CB law, as 
opposed to the increases seen in total charity care and total benefit provision. Comparison of Graph 
I to Graphs II and III shows that three years prior to the passing of the legislation, the provision of 
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charity care among treatment states exceeded both groups of control states. In contrast, the 
treatment states were providing less total charity care and less total benefits than the control groups. 
Since the provision of charity care by Illinois, Pennsylvania and South Carolina already started at 
a much higher baseline than the control groups, indicating that these states on average already 
provided more charity care than many other parts of the nation, the lack of effect produced by the 
passage of the community benefits regulation on charity care provision seems reasonable.  
In contrast, the significant increase in amount of total charity care and total benefits 
provided in CB regulation treatment states deserves attention. A couple reasons could explain the 
increase. First, though unconfirmed, the community benefit regulations may have been passed in 
the treatment states in response to their low starting levels of total charity care and total benefits 
provision. Of these three treatment states, Illinois and Pennsylvania are also two states that have 
come under public pressure in the environment of increased scrutiny and questioning of charity 
care provision (Crain’s Chicago Business 2010; Schencker 2015). Therefore, the combination of 
public pressure and impending legislation could have compelled the hospitals of the treatment 
states to increase their community benefit contributions even before legislation was passed. 
Language and purpose of the CB regulation may have also selectively increased the levels 
of total charity and total benefits. As implied in the title, the purpose of the “community benefit” 
regulation is primarily to increase total levels of community benefits, rather than specifically 
encourage hospitals to provide unreimbursed patient services. For example, the qualifying 
activities of the Illinois regulation include charity care, as well as “health services to low-income 
or underserved individuals, subsidies of state or local government programs, support for state 
health care programs for low-income individuals, and other activities” (McDermott Will & Emery 
2012) as a condition of property and sales tax provision. Similarly, the Pennsylvania legislation 
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requires that the hospital “donates or renders gratuitously a substantial portion of its services” to 
benefit the community (Pa. Stat. 375(d)). Given the language of the regulations, the legislation 
primarily aims to increase levels of total benefits to the community, which gives hospitals flexible 
options for meeting the new requirements. As a result, nonprofit hospitals may have chosen to 
meet the requirements through increases in total charity care and total benefits provision, rather 
than through expanding the provision of charity care itself.  
The implementation of financial assistance policies and financial assistance dissemination 
policies did not produce any statistically significant results, which is not surprising when 
considering the nature of financial assistance policies. Hospital charity-care and financial aid 
policies are not new; they have long played an important role in the U.S. healthcare safety net by 
forgiving the medical bills of the poor and uninsured (Evans, 2014). Legislation mandating 
hospitals to have financial assistance policies that are already largely in existence understandably 
will not have a significant effect on charity care or community benefit provision. Furthermore, a 
disconnect exists between the policy and its purpose: simply having a financial assistance policy 
will not necessarily increase the amounts of charity care provided.  
While a financial assistance dissemination policy might be expected to increase charity 
care levels by increasing consumer awareness of the financial assistance policies, the regression 
results indicate that no statistical relationship exists. As previously explained, one of the four new 
requirements for nonprofit hospitals regarding charity care under the Affordable Care Act was to 
“establish written and financial assistance and emergency medical care policies.” This requirement 
closely ties in with financial assistance policy dissemination. Illinois, for instance, requires each 
hospital to post a sign with the following notice in the admission and registration areas of the 
hospital: 
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You may be eligible for financial assistance under the terms and conditions the hospital offers to 
qualified patients. For more information contact [hospital financial assistance representative]. 
Additional requirements include a notice about financial assistance in a prominent place on the 
hospital’s website, a description of the assistance application process, and a copy of the financial 
assistance application. The information must be available in a brochure as well. Since the 
“dissemination” of an existing financial aid policy requires minimal effort, about 94% of hospitals 
had written charity care policies in place by 2012 (Nikpay and Ayanian 2015). However, even if 
these policies are readily available for patients to access, an actual increase in the levels of charity 
care provision by the hospitals requires patients to read the information, contact a representative 
to learn more, and then, if they qualify, take the initiative to obtain free care. Such a process for 
increasing charity care levels has multiple barriers, which is reflected in the lack of statistically 
significant increases in any form of community benefits post-policy implementation. Again, as 
with FA regulations, a disconnect exists; simply meeting the regulation does not lead to results. 
 In contrast, policies that limit the collection and billing practices of hospitals have the 
potential to increase charity care provision en masse. By directly influencing a hospital’s ability to 
charge for care, LCBC regulations, by nature, are relatively stringent. For instance, the LCBC 
policy for Kansas lists multiple rules, including: (1) No more than 25% of an individual’s wage 
can be subject to garnishment, (2) A court may not order the garnishment of an individual’s wages 
if the individual or a family member has an illness that prevented them from working for over two 
weeks, and (3) A creditor cannot issue more than one garnishment against the same individual 
during any 30-day period (Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-2310). Illinois and North Carolina have similar 
specific, delineated requirements. The clear specifications leave little room for open interpretation, 
reflecting the finding that specific, black-and-white rules tend to result in greater provision of 
uncompensated care (Johnson 2012).  Thus, LCBC regulations provide a concrete method of 
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limiting the hospital’s ability to collect from indigent patients. Hospitals have responded to these 
limitations, as indicated by the statistically significant increase in provision by the treatment group 
at all three levels of charity care. 
 Interestingly, in addition to the type of the regulation passed, the strength of a legislation’s 
language might affect efficacy of the implemented regulation as well, but this difference only 
seems to appear with community benefit regulations. The effects of law strength were not testable 
under LCBC regulation, because none of the treatment states contained weak legislation to begin 
with. Though this may be due to the particular sample set chosen, it may not be entirely 
coincidental. As mentioned above, LCBC regulations, by nature, are cut and dry, setting limits and 
clearly delineating hospital behavior; LCBC laws may be inherently stronger. CB regulations, on 
the other hand, can range in law strength, depending on language used. 
 External market factors, including market concentration and the local share of government 
hospital beds, also appear to influence nonprofit hospital charity care provision, but the influence 
seems to only apply to total community benefits. An increase in either the HHI or the governmental 
share of hospital beds was associated with a statistically significant reduction in total benefits 
provision, but the total charity care levels and charity care levels remained unaffected. Since 
measurements of total charity care and charity care are nestled within the total benefits 
measurement, other sources of community benefit included within total benefits are likely driving 
the reduction. Specifically, these other community benefit activities include: community health 
improvement services, community benefit operations, health professions education, subsidized 
health services, research, and cash and in-kind contributions to community groups. 
 If an increase in HHI, which is synonymous with an increase in market concentration and 
decrease in competition, is associated with a decrease in hospital provision of community benefits, 
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then this finding opposes the existing claim that increased competition decreases levels of 
uncompensated care (Gruber 1994; Keeler, Melnick and Zwanziger 1999). The decrease in 
hospital community benefit provision with an increase market concentration can potentially be 
explained by the need to “market” the charitable image of the nonprofit hospital in a competitive 
environment. Successful promotion of a charitable image to the community is associated with 
positive public perception; local citizens and officials alike look on the hospital in a more favorable 
light, and new taxing legislation is less likely to be passed if legislators know that the public is 
well educated on the benefits the hospitals provide (Kolu and Parsons 1992). Thus, engagement 
and promotion of charity care activities may help a hospital to forge a strong relationship with the 
local community, and in the end, the positive perception of the hospital may give it a competitive 
edge in a concentrated market. In contrast, a dominant hospital in a market with low levels of 
competition might not feel the need to promote a positive image through charity care, and will take 
less initiative to engage in local community benefit activities. 
 The association between an increased share of governmental hospital beds in the local 
market and decreased levels of uncompensated care is consistent with previous findings (Almond, 
Currie and Simeonova 2010). However, while all six regression models agreed upon a reduction, 
the value of the reduction varied about five percentage points, from 6.2% to 11.4%. Given the 
large degree of variability, the average reduction of about 8% should not be taken definitively. 
Rather, the finding that hospitals in the presence of more governmental hospital beds provide lower 
levels of community benefits is of interest. Furthermore, since the share of for-profit hospital beds 
exhibits no effect upon nonprofit hospital community benefit provision, these findings potentially 
indicate that nonprofit hospitals and for-profit hospitals alike make less effort to provide benefits 
for local indigent populations in the presence of a public hospital. 
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 Limitations 
 This paper is subject to a number of limitations. While the approach is exciting because 
this is one of the first studies that examines the effects of charity care regulation over time and 
across such a diverse set of states, this paper still faces data constraints. At least three states 
implemented a new regulation under the time period (2009 to 2013) for each policy examined, but 
it is possible that not enough time passed post-policy adoption for a complete understanding of the 
policy’s effect. For instance, Illinois, South Carolina and Pennsylvania were treatment states for 
the CB regulations, but they passed the legislation in 2012. Over the course of a year, the behavior 
of a hospital might not have time to noticeably alter. Thus, using data that ends in 2013 might not 
capture the entire picture. 
 Similarly, the study would likely be more robust with an expanded dataset. While the 18 
states included were carefully selected, using data from 18 out of the 50 states, and including 
hospitals in only the largest two cities of each state might only be the start of understanding 
nationwide nonprofit hospital responses to charity care policies. Ideally, the dataset could be 
expanded, particularly to include more than three states per treatment group, to provide a more 
holistic understanding of the effects of regulation. 
 The regressions using ACS data to predict charity care levels are very preliminary findings. 
These models operate under the assumption that 100% of the hospital’s patient population is 
sourced from its local zip code, which is most certainly untrue. To address this issue in the future, 
data from the Hospital Service Area File (HSAF) provided by the Research Data Assistance Center 
(RESDAC) will be used. This dataset includes information about each hospital’s Medicare claims, 
sorted by zip code; these claims will weight each neighborhood surrounding the population, giving 
a more accurate description of each hospital’s patient population.   
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Conclusion 
 Findings indicate that policies can significantly increase levels of community benefits 
provided by nonprofit hospitals, but the increase depends on the nature of the legislation passed. 
Overall, regulation that limited charges and billing collection practices of hospitals appeared to 
produce the greatest increases in charity care, total charity care and total benefits. In addition, the 
degree of efficacy may also depend on the strength and specificity of language used.  
 This paper has started to identify some aspects of policy that may be particularly effective 
at increasing nonprofit hospital provision of community benefits. More data should be obtained 
and further analyses on this topic should be performed to uncover a more comprehensive 
understanding. For instance, only four of the eight types of community benefit regulations were 
examined, so the other four regulations could be studied as well. An evidence-based understanding 
of how nonprofit hospitals respond to different state regulations may lead to a future of more 
targeted, efficient charity care policies. This, in turn, could increase medical access to individuals 
in need while also ensuring that nonprofit hospitals are deserving of their tax-exempt status. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure I. IRS Form 990 Schedule H: Definitions and Examples 
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  Figure II. Eight categories of charity care legislation, with sample states coded by law strength 
States shaded in gray had no law throughout the time period (2009 – 2013). Red = strong laws, yellow = moderate 
laws, green = weak laws. Dashed lines indicate the passage of legislation sometime during 2009 – 2013.  
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“No law” refers to states that did not have any legislation passed before or during 2009 
– 2013. “Existing” refers to states that passed legislation before 2009. Treatment states 
had legislation passed during 2009 – 2013. The value in parentheses indicates the year 
the legislation passed. 
Table I. States included in analyses, listed by regulation status and policy 
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Source: Schedule H instructions 
Table II. Explanations of the three dependent variables studied 
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Source: Hilltop Institute 
Table III. Definitions of the four types of charity care regulations studied 
  
40 
 
Graph I Graph II 
Graph III 
Control measures represent the average of all states in the 
control, across all years. ‘0’ years from switch on the x-axis 
indicates the year that legislation was passed in each treatment 
state. 
 
  
Graphs I - III: Treatment and control states under Community Benefit Regulations, for each 
dependent variable 
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Graph IV Graph V 
Graph VI 
Control measures represent the average of all states in the 
control, across all years. ‘0’ years from switch on the x-axis 
indicates the year that legislation was passed in each treatment 
state. 
 
  
Graphs IV - VI: Treatment and control states under Financial Assistance regulations, for 
each dependent variable 
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Graph 7 Graph 8 
Graph 9 
Both control measures represent the average of all states in the 
control, across all years. ‘0’ years from switch on the x-axis 
indicates the year that legislation was passed in each treatment 
state. 
 
VII VIII 
IX 
C ntrol measure  r present the average of all states in 
  
Graphs 7-9: Treatment and control states under Financial Assistance Dissemination 
regulations, for each dependent variable 
VII - IX: Treatme t and control states under Financial Assistance Dissemination 
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Graph 7 Graph 8 
Graph 9 
Both control measures represent the average of all states in the 
control, across all years. ‘0’ years from switch on the x-axis 
indicates the year that legislation was passed in each treatment 
state. 
 
X XI 
XII 
C ntrol measure  r present the average of all states in 
  
Graphs 7-9: Treatment and control states under Financial Assistance Dissemination 
regulations, for each dependent variable 
X - XII: Treatment and control states under Limitations of Charging and Billing 
Collec  regul tions, for each dependent variable 
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